MEDIAWATCH: Rethinking aid in Afghanistan
Written by: Joanne Tomkinson

Afghan children study the basics for learning Koran in an open half-built mosque on the outskirts of Kabul.
REUTERS/Ahmad Masood (AFGHANISTAN)
REUTERS/Ahmad Masood (AFGHANISTAN)
Water trucks covered in images of fighter jets - just one problem with how aid is delivered in Afghanistan, say commentators on the impoverished country's progress. Though billions of dollars have flowed into the country since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan is still struggling to recover after more than a quarter century of conflict. With the country's president, Hamid Karzai, calling for a further $50 billion over five years at a Paris donors conference this week, many commentators are calling for a rethink about how aid to country is delivered. For Anna Husarska writing for the International Herald Tribune, relief vehicles emblazoned with images of fighter jets are just one sign that aid provision has become dangerously mixed with security operations in Afghanistan. By merging its humanitarian arm - the Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs - into its wider military and political bureaucracy in Afghanistan, the United Nations has made a serious mistake, Husarska writes. "The need to independently coordinate humanitarian affairs is especially urgent; nongovernmental aid organisations are politicised by association, something very perilous given Afghanistan's volatility, particularly in the south and southeast," the policy advisor at international relief organisation International Rescue Committee says. Rosie DiManno, columnist for Canadian newspaper the Toronto Star meanwhile finds that it's the non-governmental organisations themselves that are an especially problematic part of aid delivery in Afghanistan. "Poor co-ordination among aid agencies, an overlap in some areas, quick fix schemes that haven't been sustained, and vanity projects designed to please domestic audiences in foreign countries rather than addressing this one's urgent needs" are the most serious problems for DiManno. Though money has been pouring into the impoverished country for several years, aid effectiveness has been undermined by disorganised donor interventions, she writes. "Contractors and non-governmental organisations have feasted on a system with little or no accountability for money received," she says. "Afghans, sending their young children out to lug water back from a village well, can't understand why foreigners - the NGOs in particular - are living in comparatively lavish compounds, driving their ubiquitous Range Rovers, and employing huge staff." For David Loyn, writing for the BBC, the key issue at the Paris donor conference is not just how to get more money to Afghanistan. "It is about trying to find a better way of improving the flow of aid and building the capacity of the Afghan government to manage affairs for itself." Too much development aid has gone straight back to donor countries in the pockets of consultants, Loyn says, citing a World Bank report calling the phenomenon a "second civil service". For Loyn, the fact that some 65-70 percent of donor money is spent outside the government budget is hugely problematic. More money must be channelled through the Afghan government, which is working to improve its accountability and transparency, he writes. For the Chicago Tribune, meanwhile, the real problems with aid in Afghanistan are the competing agendas of international donors, and a lack of transparency on the part of the Afghan government. "Coordination among donor countries has continued to be a problem, even with the appointment in March of UN envoy Kai Eide, who has the mandate to bring greater coherence to reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan," the paper says. The Economist, however, writes that it's the Afghan government that remains the biggest obstacle to success. The magazine says rampant corruption and the declining popularity of Karzai's government put attempts to channel more aid through official channels on shaky ground. Unless the Kabul government can be made to work more effectively, the efforts of the international community may be in vain, the magazine writes.
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2 responses to “MEDIAWATCH: Rethinking aid in Afghanistan”
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13 Jun 2008 11:45:24 GMT
At least in central Helmand, the farmers have lost confidence with the central government and the foreign donors because of the lack of follow up on promises of support for their markets of legitimate crops and the reconstruction effort. Corruption is a function of hopelessness. Local government no longer feels that anything useful will happen, see millions spent on useless projects, get offered large sums of money to look the other way with opium poppy while not getting paid their minimal on time or at all.They understand that no one actually cares...so why not? Development agencies get judged by the amounts of money they spend, not on results. So pointless expensive projects get rewarded, like womens' parks, fountains,cobble stone roads built by Bolivian contractors to ancient ruins, establishing national parks, etc etc, while the price of cotton paid to farmers by government cotton gins remains minimal...and the farmers keep ! asking for a better price as an step in ending the cultivation of opium poppy. Why not try doing the obvious: focus on projects that directly benefit the farmers that are trying to be influenced? The media tends to ignore the facts.
14 Jun 2008 18:28:03 GMT
I agree with Richard Scott's suggestion," Why not try doing the obvious: focus on projects that directly benefit the farmers that are trying to be influenced" and I would like to take this further.
By legalizing the cultivation of the opium poppy and establishing the fair trade production of morphine tablets would benefit not only the farmers, also the Afghan economy, and would help to relieve the global shortage of morphine. It would also weaken the Taliban's hold on the opium farmers and decrease the supply of illegal heroin. This is a common sense strategy within the global context and exercises the potential for far reaching alleviation of suffering. Underdeveloped nations only consume 8% of the worldâs supply of morphine. This is a win win win strategy and one that needs to be considered seriously. I hope Ms. Tomkinson you will have the desire to explore this common sense and compassionate strategy further with an article. The Senlis Council is a very good starting point for researching it. Thank you.